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Abstract 
In recent years and particularly since the global financial crisis, zombie firms—unprofitable 
businesses supported by financial relief—have generated widespread concern due to their 
purported harm to economic vitality. Economic studies hold that zombie firms impede the 
normal flow of capital and human resources to healthy businesses, and thereby defy creative 
destruction and hurt investment and employment growth. But what causes zombie firms to 
occur? Addressing this question from a political economy perspective, this paper investigates 
a novel hypothesis about the role of credit guarantees in supporting weak firms. The results of 
a case study of small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) in Japan in the 1990s and 2000s 
suggest that Japan’s credit guarantee system may indeed have contributed to numerous 
zombies among this firm category. However, evidence also suggests that these firms tended 
to quickly escape from zombie status, calling into question the negative connotation of the 
zombie firm concept.
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1. Introduction
This paper examines the case of zombie firms among small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SME) in Japan since the banking crisis in the 1990s. Though SME—a corporate 
category comprised of manufacturing firms with no more than 300 employees and ¥300 
million in capital, and wholesale, service and retail firms with no more than 100 employees 
and ¥100 million in capital—generally attract less attention than listed firms which have higher 
individual employee numbers and capitalization and more famous products and services, 
they are commonly considered the “backbone” of Japan’s economy for their importance in 
terms of overall firm numbers and contribution to national employment. In recent years, SME 
have represented more than 99 percent of Japanese companies and 70 percent of Japanese 
employment, as well as 50 percent of added value in the manufacturing industry (Small and 
Medium Enterprise Agency 2008, 24–25). Therefore, the zombie presence in this corporate 
group carries broad significance for the overall Japanese economy as well as the wider debate 
about zombie firms.
The paper begins with the surprising finding that the zombie ratio among Japanese SME 
remained high throughout the 2000s. The substantial zombie SME presence in this period 
differs from the situation among stock exchange-listed (“large”) firms where the zombie ratio 
declined in the early 2000s, and potentially signifies that a different mechanism undergirded 
zombie SME which endured longer than the factors which produced zombies among large 
firms. Furthermore, it implies that this form of protectionism toward SME persisted well into 
the 2000s, in defiance of conventional theory expecting that electoral system reform in the 
mid-1990s would usher in neoliberal policies and pro-market competition.
The paper proceeds in three parts. First, it presents descriptive statistics on zombie SME 
in Japan’s lost decades. These statistics depict the zombie ratio among SME—the outcome 
variable of interest—as well as certain attributes of the zombie SME, including the zombie 
presence among SME of different sizes and the time duration that zombie SME stay in zombie 
status. These statistics are partly based on a recent analysis by Goto and Wilbur (2019) 
of data in the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) Basic Survey of Japanese 
Business Structure and Activities (BSJBSA), making them broadly representative of Japanese 
SME with 50 or more employees and whose paid-up capital and investment are higher than 
¥30 million. They are also drawn from a forthcoming study of credit guarantee-using SME by 
Goto and Wilbur which utilizes data from Japan’s Credit Risk Database showing the zombie 
firm ratio among SME which have actually taken credit guarantees.
Next, the paper discusses the role of Japan’s credit guarantee system for SME in 
relationship to the notably high zombie ratio evident in these statistics. It first describes how 
government guarantees that systematically increase the availability of credit may lead to higher 
incidence of zombie firms. It then explains how Japan’s credit guarantee system expanded the 
credit available to SME throughout the 1990s and 2000s, and how the system’s substantial 
size and complete and nearly-complete coverage ratios facilitated widespread lending to firms 
with lower creditworthiness and higher potential to take financial relief associated with zombie 
status.
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Third, the paper explains the political underpinnings of Japan’s credit guarantee system, 
clarifying how and why the system’s high-level guarantees lasted throughout the 2000s 
despite their effect on giving life support to many weak firms, a sizeable percentage of which 
took zombie status. In accounting for how the system endured mostly unchanged during this 
period, the paper assembles evidence that key features of the system experienced policy drift 
through a combination of factors including limited public access to policymaking, uncertainty 
about the possible consequences of policy adjustment, and collective action barriers for the 
pro-reform coalition. These factors outweighed opposition by economists concerned about the 
system’s cost and by public sentiment which favored neoliberal structural reforms, enabling 
the continuation of a policy arrangement which sustained a substantial number of zombie 
SME.
2. Statistics on Zombie Firms among Japan’s SME
Until recently, research on zombie firms in Japan neglected their occurrence among 
SME despite the category’s inclusion of the vast majority of Japanese firms (Caballero, Hoshi, 
and Kashyap 2008; Fukuda and Nakamura 2011). The first known analysis of zombie SME 
is by Imai (2016), who identifies the zombie ratio among a sample of unlisted firms from 
the Tokyo Shoko Research database.1  Imai observes that the zombie firm ratio in his SME 
sample annually ranges between 5 and 14 percent and averages 8 percent in the period 1999-
2008 (Imai 2016, 94–95), a finding which differs from earlier studies suggesting that Japanese 
banks rarely evergreened their loans to SME and therefore produced few zombies among this 
firm category (Fukuda, Kasuya, and Nakajima 2006; Sakai, Uesugi, and Watanabe 2010). 
Imai’s zombie ratio for SME is also notably higher than the ratio for listed firms found by 
Fukuda and Nakamura (henceforth “FN”), which rises to a high of nearly 10 percent of firms 
in 2001 and then remains near 5 percent between 2003 and 2007 until the start of the global 
financial crisis (Fukuda and Nakamura 2011, 1128; Nakamura and Fukuda 2013, 6).
Imai further shows that different SME size categories have different zombie firm ratios. 
The ratio for the smallest size class of SME with less than ¥10 million (approximately $100,000) 
in equity capital peaks at more than 25 percent in 1999 and remains above 12 percent in the 
period 1999-2008. During the same period, the ratio for the largest size category of SME with 
more than ¥1 billion (roughly $10 million) in equity capital is at least 5 percent lower in every 
year except 2004 (Imai 2016, 95–96) (Figure 1). In short, the zombie firm ratio for SME is 
significantly higher than the ratio for listed firms for much of the 2000s, and smaller-size SME 
have a particularly high tendency to undergo zombification (Imai 2016, 97–98).
1. Both Imai and the two works by Goto and Wilbur use the Fukuda and Nakamura (2011) definition 
of zombie firms. Fukuda and Nakamura define zombie firms as firms whose earnings before interest 
and taxes (EBIT) are less than the firms’ hypothetical risk-free interest payments, and who receive 
financial support in the form of either 1) having interest payments which are lower than the calculated 
hypothetical risk-free interest payments (“discounted interest payments”); or 2) evergreening lending.
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Figure 1. Zombie Firm Ratio among Japanese SME by Equity Capital, 1999-2008
Source: Imai (2016, 96)
One limitation in Imai’s study is the small sample size of 2,357 firms, which reduces the 
scale of inference about zombie firms among SME. To amend this deficiency and explore 
additional issues surrounding zombie SME including average time spent in zombie status, 
Goto and Wilbur (2019) use a larger sample that includes more than 30,000 firms with between 
50 and 499 employees and at least ¥30 million in equity capital from the METI BSJBSA. Their 
estimate of the zombie SME ratio with this enlarged sample is limited to the period 2010-
2014, since the BSJBSA only contains data on short-term and long-term bank borrowing and 
corporate bond issuance from the year 2009, and the FN definition requires the calculation 
of differences in bank bor-rowing amount from the previous year. However, even in this short 
period, they observe a zombie ratio of at least 14 percent for SME with less than ¥100 million 
in equity capital, a non-negligible per-centage (Figure 2). Similar to Imai’s earlier finding, the 
smaller the firm size, the higher is its zombie ratio.
Figure 2. Zombie Firm Ratio among Japanese SME, 2010-2014
Source: Goto and Wilbur (2019) 
Note 1: Unit is percentage  
Note 2: Small = Firms with less than ¥100 million in equity capital; Middle = Firms with between ¥100 
million and ¥1 billion in equity capital; Large = Firms with more than ¥1 billion in equity capital
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Table 1. FE Panel Logit Model for Exit and FN Definition-Zombie: 
Zombie Firms Are Likely to Exit Especially Among SME
Note: BSJBSA data allows estimation for the period 2009-2014. Since the dependent variable is as an 
exit dummy for the next term, the estimation period here is 2009-2013.
Source: Goto and Wilbur (2019)
Goto and Wilbur (2019) also investigate the question of how long zombie firms endure 
in zombie status (Table 1). Using a regression model with exit from zombie status as the 
dependent variable (a dummy variable which takes “1” if the firm exits), they find that when a 
SME becomes a zombie, the probability of its exit significantly increases, while the same is not 
true for large firms. This finding implies that SME with zombie status tend to shed such status 
quickly, meaning that they do not perpetually congest the market as the “zombie firm” concept 
denotes, but rather return to health. In other words, while SME and especially smaller-size 
SME have a greater tendency to become zombies than do their large firm counterparts, they 
tend not remain in zombie status for long. Instead, they may hover tenuously close the edge 
of becoming zombies while still operating as going concerns, and only dip into zombie status 
during temporary downturns before swiftly returning to viability, however marginal.
Finally, in a forthcoming work, Goto and Wilbur use firm-level data from Japan’s Credit 
Risk Database (CRD), which covers financial information of SME using Japan’s credit 
guarantee system, to assess the zombie ratio among Japanese SME taking credit guarantees. 
In the period 1998-2015, they preliminarily find that after 1999 the zombie ratio is consistently 
above 20 percent of guarantee-receiving firms, and often notably higher. This tentative finding 
closely implies that credit guarantees have been associated with widespread zombie SME 
creation, given that the annual average number of firms in the CRD in the sample period runs 
in the hundreds of thousands of firms.
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3. Zombie SME and Japan’s Credit Guarantee 
System
Descriptive statistics show that zombie firms existed at a notably higher rate among SME 
than among listed firms in Japan, particularly in the second “lost” decade in the 2000s. This 
finding suggests that a different mechanism possibly supported the creation of zombie SME, 
given that the factors which produced zombies among Japan’s listed firms were largely tackled 
by bank supervision and accounting reforms starting in the late 1990s, and that the zombie 
ratio among listed firms peaked in 2001 and fell to a low level shortly thereafter (Fukuda and 
Nakamura 2011). Moreover, Japan’s economy expanded in the mid-2000s, posting average 
annual real GDP growth of 2 percent between 2003 and 2007 that was twice the 1 percent 
average between 1992 and 2002 (Lincoln 2011, 357). Aggregate economic recovery lessened 
the “unnatural selection” rationale for banks to evergreen loans to distressed firms to hide the 
banks’ own debt (Peek and Rosengren 2005), since growth propelled many firms to financial 
health and decreased the level of nonperforming loans in Japanese banks from 8.4 percent of 
total lending in March 2002 to 4.7 percent in September 2004 (OECD 2005, 14).
Additionally, the resiliently high zombie SME ratio in the 2000s defies the expectation by 
prominent theory that electoral reform in the mid-1990s would shift Japan’s political economy 
from particularism toward neoliberalism. According to this theory, electoral rule change in 
Japan’s lower house in 1994 from multi-member districts with a single nontransferable vote to a 
combination of single member districts and proportional blocs would shake “the hidden ballast 
undergirding the ‘Japanese variety of capitalism’ by lessening political incentives to cultivate 
personal sources of campaign capital,” thereby advancing economic policies less beholden 
to narrow interests and more responsive to urban voters concerned about curbing wasteful 
spending and lowering budget deficits (Rosenbluth and Thies 2010, 125, 134). Nonetheless, 
the descriptive statistics above suggest that many SME, including numerous zombie SME, 
received protection well into the 21st century, calling into question the theorized outcome that 
“capital has become more mobile in Japan’s new political economy” after electoral reform 
(Rosenbluth and Thies 2010, 126).
How did many zombie SME continue to exist in the early 21st century despite financial 
reforms, a positive macroeconomic climate, and changes in electoral rules? One possibility 
is that zombie SME were supported by policies that systematically enhanced the availability 
of loans to firms whose financial conditions were fundamentally tenuous and thus prone to 
repayment difficulty. To recall, banks have an incentive to extend financial leniency toward 
distressed firms when they believe that the firms can ultimately return to profitability and viability 
(Peek 2009). This motivation may be heightened (or “perverted”) in serious recessions when 
banks hold large amounts of debt and view refinancing to potentially defaulting firms as a way 
to disguise nonperforming loans and avoid fire sales of collateral to cover debt write-offs (Peek 
and Rosengren 2005; Jaskowski 2015). But there is no theoretical reason to believe that it 
only exists during crises. Rather, the key factor remains banks’ assessment of default risk. If 
banks have grounds to believe that they can recover their loans, they have an incentive to 
expand lending to more firms, including firms that may appear weaker, since the banks should 
both reclaim their loan principal and earn interest payments.
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Consequently, one potential cause of zombie firms would be a policy arrangement 
that systematically induces banks to provide financing to firms with flimsier financial health, 
which should increase the number of instances when banks choose to support distress-prone 
borrowers as zombies. To be clear, such a credit-enhancing arrangement would not have 
creating zombie firms as its direct intention, since banks profit more when loans are repaid 
on-time and at non-discounted interest rates. However, it would heighten the probability that 
banks are confronted with scenarios where they may decide to assist firms in arrears and turn 
them into zombies, because it would expand the banks’ potential customer base to include 
businesses whose financial conditions might otherwise exclude them as borrowers, or at least 
rank them lower among the banks’ desired clientele.
3.1. Japan’s Credit Guarantee System as a Credit 
Enhancement Arrangement
Japan has possessed precisely such a credit enhancement arrangement in the form 
of its credit guarantee system (Shin’yo hosho seido) for SME, a system through which the 
Japanese government guarantees loans to SME issued by private banks. This system 
dates to 1937, when the Tokyo metropolitan government first established the Tokyo Credit 
Guarantee Corporation based on a model that existed in Germany. Following the inclusion 
of the system as a key measure in the SME Financial Measures Summary by the cabinet 
of Prime Minister Ashida Hitoshi’s Democratic and Socialist coalition government in August 
1948 (Bank of Japan Financial Research Institute 1989, 602–3), other local governments 
founded their own credit guarantee corporations, and the SME Credit Insurance Law and 
Credit Guarantee Corporation Law were respectively enacted in December 1950 and August 
1953 to codify the system’s emerging financial structure. Since 1961, Japan’s 47 prefectures 
and the five cities of Osaka, Nagoya, Yokohama, Kawasaki, and Gifu have each had their own 
credit guarantee corporation, which collectively constitute Japan’s credit guarantee system 
(SME Policy Council Finance Working Group 2015, 8).
Figure 3. Schematic Map of Japan’s Credit Guarantee System
Source: Author, based on Ito (2011, 4)
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As its name implies, the credit guarantee system enhances the credit available to SME by 
offering government guarantees on private bank financing, which mitigates banks’ default risk 
and encourages them to lend to SME borrowers. Figure 3 illustrates how the system fulfills this 
function. First, a small firm that wants to obtain a guaranteed loan applies for a credit guarantee 
either at the counter of a credit guarantee corporation, or through a financial institution that 
applies to the corporation on the firm’s behalf (1.). The corporation then conducts a credit 
investigation of the firm, and if the guarantee is approved (2.), the bank issues a guaranteed 
loan to the firm (3.). After the loan is issued, the firm begins repaying the bank and pays a 
separate guarantee fee to the corporation (4.). If the bank does not receive loan repayment 
by a certain time, the corporation assumes the principal and interest obligations of the bank, 
a process called subrogation (5.). After the corporation makes its subrogation payment to the 
bank, it collects outstanding funds from the firm while looking at its business conditions (6.) 
(Ito 2011, 3–4). 
While the credit guarantee system engages SME insofar as it helps them acquire private 
financing at the small additional cost of the guarantee fee, it also insures individual credit 
guarantee corporations when they make subrogation payments to banks. The corporations’ 
primary insurer is the Japan Finance Corporation (JFC), a government finance institution (GFI) 
which also provides direct loans to SME.2 Credit guarantee corporations currently pay between 
0.45 and 1.9 percent in insurance premiums to the JFC according to the type of subrogation 
insurance (Yamori 2015, 8). They also pay the JFC any funds that the corporations collect 
from defaulting firms after the subrogation payment, though the collection rate tends to be 
very low (Ito 2011, 5).3 
Beside the JFC, three other actors operate on the insurance side of the system where the 
system’s costs are primarily located. In terms of financial support for the system, two of these 
actors have lesser importance—the National Federation of Credit Guarantee Corporations, 
which is the peak organization for the 52 individual credit guarantee corporations; and regional 
governments, including prefectural governments and municipal governments for the five 
cities with credit guarantee corporations. These two actors primarily assist with individual 
credit guarantee corporations’ loss compensation. The third actor which carries much more 
weight is Japan’s central government. The central government provides compensation and 
contributions to the JFC, while also giving smaller direct subsidies to individual corporations.
A comparison of these actors’ spending reveals their relative economic significance for 
maintaining the system. In fiscal year 2011, regional governments paid a combined total of 
¥75.5 billion in loss compensation to credit guarantee corporations. In the same year, the JFC 
paid ¥660.1 billion in insurance payments to the corporations and received only ¥146.5 billion 
2. The credit guarantee system’s original insurer was the SME Credit Insurance Corporation, a public 
corporation founded in 1958. In July 1999, this corporation merged with the Japan Small Business 
Corporation and the Textile Industry Restructuring Agency to form a new organization called the Japan 
Small and Medium Enterprise Corporation (JASMEC). In July 2004, JASMEC transferred its credit 
insurance operations to the Japan Finance Corporation for Small and Medium Enterprise (JASME). 
In October 2008, JASME, the National Life Finance Corporation (NLFC), the Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries Finance Corporation, and the International Financing Operations of Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation (JBIC) integrated and became the Japan Finance Corporation (JFC), which 
currently insures the credit guarantee system (National Federation of Credit Guarantee Corporations 
2011, 2–3).
3. A credit guarantee corporation director corroborated this point (Interview 64).
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in insurance premiums from the corporations, leaving the JFC with an insurance deficit of 
¥397.9 billion (approximately $4 billion in US dollars). To enable the JFC to absorb this sizable 
insurance loss and continue its main backstop function for the credit guarantee system, the 
central government apportioned ¥1.04 trillion to the JFC (Yamori 2015, 14–15). Though these 
figures vary slightly by year, this example clearly shows that the central government bears the 
largest cost for enabling the credit guarantee system for SME.
3.2. The Credit Guarantee System’s Role in SME Finance 
during the Lost Decades
Japan’s credit guarantee system was established in the early postwar period to enhance 
financial access for all SME. But part of the system’s function has also been to boost credit 
availability to targeted classes of firms through specific guarantee programs designed to 
meet current policy objectives. Since 1955, the system has had over 50 specific programs 
in addition to its regular guarantee program. For example, several specific programs have 
aimed at facilitating business creation and expansion, such as programs in new technology 
development, overseas investment financing, and new business development during the 
1980s. Other targeted programs have increased the availability of credit to SME affected by 
natural disasters, such as the 1994 Kobe earthquake. Among the system’s specific programs, 
the largest have typically served firms affected by economic change, such as its management 
stabilization programs to support SME after the oil crisis in the 1970s and during the period of 
yen appreciation following the 1985 Plaza Accord (Nitani and Riding 2005, 59–62).
The biggest ever specific guarantee program was enacted as a response to Japan’s 
banking crisis in the 1990s. In August 1998, the cabinet of newly inaugurated Prime Minister 
Obuchi Keizo decided on an outline of countermeasures for Japan’s tight credit market 
and included a ¥30 trillion increase in the credit guarantee system’s budget to expand the 
number of loans issued through the system. Two months after this announcement, at the 
same time as the Diet passed the Financial Revitalization Act and the Financial Function 
Early Strengthening Act to recapitalize major banks, it pushed through a specific guarantee 
program called the “Special Guarantee for the Financial Stabilization of SME” (Chusho kigyo 
kin’yu anteika tokubetsu shin’yo hosho) (henceforth “Special Guarantee Program”), which 
offered 100 percent credit guarantees to SME whose lending institutions could show that the 
firms’ business conditions had deteriorated since the previous year. Between October 1998 
and termination in March 2001, the Special Guarantee Program was used in 1.7 million loans 
totaling ¥28.9 trillion ($270 billion) in guaranteed loans, making it the biggest ever expansion 
of Japan’s credit guarantee system (Uesugi and Sakai 2005, 6).4 In 2000 alone, 455,959 
loans were approved through the program with a total loan value of ¥7.4 trillion, which were, 
respectively, 30 percent of the loans and 41.1 percent of the total loan value issued through 
the entire credit guarantee system (Nitani and Riding 2005, 61).5   
4. Part of the reason for the Special Guarantee Program’s huge uptake was the ease with which SME 
could succeed in their guarantee applications through the program. Credit guarantee corporations had 
a negative list of conditions to reject applicants, including default and window dressing of balance 
sheets. However, these conditions were notoriously hard to satisfy (Interview 32).
5. The METI Small and Medium Enterprise Agency (SMEA) claimed that the Special Guarantee 
Program’s massive scale and utilization saved some 9,600 small firms from bankruptcy compared to 
the more than 28,000 firms that went bankrupt in the program’s two-year period (SME Policy Council 
12
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While the Special Guarantee Program encouraged enormous numbers of SME to take 
advantage of the credit guarantee system, a shift simultaneously underway in the government’s 
relationship with SME financing also heightened the system’s significance at the turn of the 
21st century. Since the early postwar period, the Japanese government was directly involved 
in lending to SME through several GFI including the National Life Finance Corporation (NLFC) 
(1949- ), the Japan Finance Corporation for Small and Medium Enterprise (JASME) (1953- 
) and the Shoko Chukin Bank (1936- ). Loans by these three GFI, especially the first two, 
served as a form of redistribution to SME dealing with economic turbulence during the early 
postwar years, and were a preferred policy tool of the government because they did not require 
additional budgetary outlays and thus enabled the government to concentrate its limited fiscal 
resources on reindustrialization (Park 2011, 74). Successive LDP governments gradually 
increased the amount of policy finance available to these GFI through the Fiscal Investment 
and Loan Program (FILP) in the 1950s and 1960s, so that they could continue to provide for 
the social security of SME and appeal to them as a political constituency while maintaining 
budget restraint (Park 2011, 97–111). However, after the LDP’s poor showing in the December 
1972 general election, the government significantly expanded GFI loans, increasing them 
sevenfold to ¥28.6 billion in 1979 and ultimately to ¥30.9 trillion in 1992 (Calder 1988, 346; 
Shimizu 2013, 161).
Figure 4. Outstanding Loans and Outstanding Guaranteed Loans for Japanese SME and 
Microenterprises, 1997-2014
Source: SME Policy Council Finance Working Group (2015, 11) 
Unit: ¥1 trillion
Finance Working Group 2015, 9). On the other hand, outside observers countered that the program 
merely delayed, rather than stopped, a wave of bankruptcies which occurred after the program’s end 
(OECD 2000, 46–47).
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As Japan’s economic situation deteriorated during the banking crisis in the 1990s, a 
combination of mounting fiscal pressures and enhanced Cabinet Office powers enabled Prime 
Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro initiate the long-held goal of FILP reform (Toyoda 2011, 162). 
One outcome of FILP reform was a decline in the government’s ability to provide SME loans 
through the GFI. At the same time, because the credit guarantee system relied on private 
banks, it became a crucial platform for continuing the government’s support of small firms. 
Figure 4 shows the contrasting trends of public loans and guaranteed private loans within 
overall SME lending 
in the period 1997-2014. While the amounts of these two loan types were similar in 
1997, from the time of the introduction of the Special Guarantee Program in 1998, the credit 
guarantee system came to support a much larger amount of loans to SME than the GFI. 
The share of GFI loans within Japan’s overall SME finance stayed between 8.7 and 10.3 
percent between 1998 and 2014, but the absolute amount fell from ¥29 trillion in 1998 to 
¥21.9 trillion in 2014, a 25 percent decline. By contrast, the credit guarantee system’s weight 
among SME finance remained between 11.4 and 14.8 percent during these years. In fiscal 
year 2014, 911,000 SME borrowed from the NLFC, 47,000 SME borrowed from the JASME, 
and 76,000 SME borrowed from Shoko Chukin Bank. By comparison, 1.4 million SME used 
credit guarantees, meaning that the system served approximately one-third of Japan’s 3.85 
million SME (SME Policy Council Finance Working Group 2015, 9). 
With the implementation of the Special Guarantee Program in 1998 and the government’s 
concurrent shift from direct financing through GFI to indirect financing through private banks, 
Japan’s credit guarantee system became the largest credit guarantee system in the world 
(Christensen et al. 1999). The amount of loans guaranteed through the system declined 
after the Special Guarantee Program ended in 2001, but rose again following the global 
financial crisis, when the Japanese government instituted another large-scale specific loan 
program called the “Emergency Guarantee System” (Kinkyu hosho seido) that provided 100 
percent guarantees between October 2008 and March 2011. In 2014, outstanding guarantee 
obligations in Japan’s credit guarantee system reached ¥27.7 trillion (Table 1). This figure was 
almost four times higher than the next largest credit guarantee system in America despite 
the two economies’ vast size difference, and bigger than other major foreign credit guarantee 
systems combined.
Aside from unparalleled size, two other points are notable about Japan’s credit guarantee 
system in the 21st century. The first is the system’s high coverage ratios. Whereas credit 
guarantee systems in other major countries have offered loan guarantees in a range between 
40 and 75 percent of loan values—levels at which banks still assume substantial risk in case 
of loan default—Japan’s system has provided guarantees between 80 and 100 percent of loan 
values, with a large majority of the system users receiving 100 percent guarantees (Small and 
Medium Enterprise Agency 2016, 5) (Table 2). As will be elaborated in the following section, 
Japan’s high coverage ratios free banks to loosen lending standards and provide loans to 
firms with weaker creditworthiness, making Japan’s credit guarantee system more likely to 
sustain zombie firms among its SME users.
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Table 2. International Comparison of Credit Guarantee Systems in 2014
Source: Small and Medium Enterprise Agency (2016, 3)6 
Financial Unit: ¥1 billion
The second point relates to the timing when Japan’s credit guarantee system has 
provided high-level guarantees. As Table 3 shows, many countries temporarily increase their 
systems’ coverage ratios in response to economic downturns, which reflects how governments 
can adjust credit guarantee systems to increase the availability of financing which otherwise 
might not exist, a property of credit guarantee systems commonly known as “additionality” or 
“incrementality” (Riding, Madill, and Haines 2007). By contrast, Japan’s provision of complete 
and nearly- complete coverage has occurred not only in crisis times, but even in positive 
macroeconomic conditions. For example, Japan’s system has consistently given 100 percent 
guarantees to microenterprises with 5 or less employees—a corporate category which 
constitutes 87 percent of SME in Japan and more than 70 percent of the system’s 1.4 million 
users (SME Policy Council Finance Working Group 2015, 9, 13)—and to SME in declining 
industries which qualify for  safety-net guarantees. The continuing reliance of large numbers 
of Japanese SME on credit guarantees implies that the system has been of vital importance 
to many firms whose precarious financial positions fundamentally challenge their obtainment 
of credit.
6. Figures from America are from 2015.
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Table 3. International Comparison of Credit Guarantee Systems in Normal and Crisis Times
Source: Small and Medium Enterprise Agency (2016, 5)
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3.3. Japan’s Credit Guarantee System as a Facilitator of 
Zombie Firms
Japan’s credit guarantee system, like other countries’ credit guarantee systems, has 
primarily functioned to enhance users’ access to credit. Yet, by existing on a massive scale 
and providing perfect or near-perfect guarantee ratios to millions of SME, it has also been 
responsible for facilitating lending relationships between banks and many weak firms, some 
of which have undergone zombie status. A key reason why Japan’s system may contribute to 
zombie formation is that its guarantee ratios entirely or substantially reduce banks’ default risk, 
which enables banks to lend to SME with less concern about the possibility of nonpayment. 
Lower risk allows banks to overcome the information asymmetries which typically reduce 
banks’ desire for SME customers, increasing their willingness to finance this category of 
borrower.
The certainty that Japan’s credit guarantee system affords banks in avoiding default risk—
which increases the banks’ willingness to lend to all firms, including weak firms more likely to 
default and need refinancing which turns them into zombies—has widely been discussed by 
Japanese economists as a moral hazard, since the insurance side of the system reduces banks’ 
potential for incurring financial loss and their corresponding motivation to distinguish between 
viable and nonviable borrowers when screening loan applications (Ito 2011; Ono, Uesugi, and 
Yasuda 2013; Saito and Tsuruta 2014). The system’s 100 percent guarantee, widely used by 
entire categories of SME like microenterprises but also by some firms qualifying for specific 
loan programs such as the Safety Net Number 5 program for SME in declining industries, is 
the clearest example of how the system enables adverse selection, since it fully covers banks 
in the case of repayment failure—thereby removing banks’ need to minimize loan defaults 
by monitoring borrowers or advocating improved business planning—while giving borrowers 
no incentive to restructure (Yamori 2011, 24). But even the system’s 80 percent guarantee, 
which was first instituted in October 2007 through the so-called “responsibility-sharing system” 
(Sekinin kyoyu seido), has been insufficient at eliminating moral hazard, though it lessened it 
to a degree (Saito and Tsuruta 2014).
While moral hazard is important in explaining the credit guarantee system’s effect on 
increasing bank lending, it is only capable of creating large numbers of zombie firms to the 
extent that many of the system’s users are prone to failing in their loan repayments and 
needing banks to practice forbearance. Available evidence suggests that the financial health 
of many SME receiving credit guarantees is indeed tenuous. According to data from the credit 
guarantee system’s Credit Risk Database (CRD), the average system user in fiscal year 2003 
had 6 employees, ¥125 million ($1.25 million) in sales, ¥84 million ($840,000) in total assets, 
and ¥10 million ($100,000) in capital stock (Shikano 2008, 25). The CRD data further show that 
the average user’s operating profit and net income were ¥1 million ($10,000) and ¥400,000 
($4,000). These statistics reveal the very small size of most system users as well as their 
typically thin operational margins, a pattern that occurs because much of the firms’ operational 
expenses like human resources are fixed. Consequently, these firms are highly dependent on 
sales to survive, and sales fluctuations can easily threaten their solvency (Shikano 2008, 52).
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Beside the fragile business conditions of many credit guarantee system users, their 
financial structure also makes them more likely to become zombie firms. The CRD data 
indicate that most system users have low equity capital ratios—on average, 11 percent—
which leaves them highly dependent on long-term borrowing and reinforces the significance 
of their relationships with banks. Also, since more than half of system users with less than 20 
employees have operational loss carryovers, it is apparent that many users are only able to 
survive because of the financial life support they receive from bank loans (Shikano 2008, 85). 
These findings are less true of large SME users with more than 100 employees, implying that 
the bigger a SME grows, the less likely it is to have tenuous business conditions and rely on 
borrowing, and thus possibly need this form of financing associated with zombie status.
The descriptive statistics cited above depict a corresponding picture of the zombie firm 
ratio among Japanese SME during the “lost” decades, especially after 2000. Strong direct 
evidence appears in the forthcoming work by Goto and Wilbur, whose analysis reveals a 
zombie ratio among guarantee-using firms of roughly 15 percent or higher during the period 
1996-2007. Indirect evidence also appears in Imai (2016), who shows that the smallest size 
category of SME in his sample—firms with less than ¥10 million ($100,000) in capital stock—
has an extremely high zombie ratio exceeding 25 percent in 1999, the peak year of Japan’s 
credit guarantee system in terms of absolute amount of guaranteed loans under the Special 
Guarantee Program. Imai also shows that the zombie ratio for this SME category remains 
above 12 percent through 2008, an outcome which reflects the frail business conditions 
of many microenterprises, large amounts of which are dependent on credit guarantees for 
financing. 
4. Drift in Japan’s Credit Guarantee System
Given the negative connotations and criticism surrounding zombie firms, the evidence 
implicating Japan’s credit guarantee system in the creation of zombie SME in the early 21st 
century begs the question: How could the system’s role in zombie formation among SME 
persist mostly unchanged after Japan’s broader economic recovery? One hypothesis is that 
the system’s high level of protection, namely its large scale and generous guarantee ratios, 
underwent drift. Conceptually, drift occurs when decision-makers do not revise formal rules 
when shifting developments change the social effects of the rules in ways that are recognized 
by at least some political actors. In the case of Japan’s credit guarantee system, drift could 
explain why the system’s substantial size and high guarantee ratios persisted through the 
2000s, despite a positive macroeconomic climate and concern that the system allowed moral 
hazard by encouraging banks to give financial life support to firms with fundamentally poor 
business prospects.
For the hypothesis of drift to be supported, evidence would need to show that its causal 
mechanisms existed in the politics surrounding credit guarantee system and contributed to a 
status quo bias in the system. Possible mechanisms for drift include the interaction between 
decision-making institutions such the separation of powers that gives rise to veto players 
(Tsebelis 1995), limited public access to policymaking which may indirectly bolster the 
influence of well-organized interests in shaping legislative proposals (Hacker, Pierson, and 
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Thelen 2015), policy feedback effects that create vested interests who subsequently rally to 
block change (Pierson 1996; Levinson and Sachs 2015; Starr 2015), uncertainty about the 
possible consequences of policy adjustment (Shepsle 1986), and collective action barriers to 
building pro-reform coalitions (Hardin 1989).
Evidence suggests that many of these mechanisms were indeed present in the politics of 
the credit guarantee system, hampering system reform and reinforcing the system’s contribution 
to zombie SME creation in the 2000s. The only of these mechanisms that was absent was 
the separation of powers. In Japan’s parliamentary system, the executive is responsible to the 
legislature, especially the lower house of the Diet, and is not separately elected. Moreover, 
the upper house has few powers to check the lower house’s decisions. Though the upper 
house can vote down bills passed by the lower house and force the lower house to overcome 
a two-thirds vote to pass the vetoed legislation, it has no power to block the lower house on 
budgetary matters. Thus, even though Japan’s Diet was “twisted” (nejire) and had different 
political parties controlling its upper and lower houses on multiple occasions between 1994 
and 2014—1997-1998, 1998-1999, 2007-2009, 2010-2012, and 2012-2013—there was only 
modest potential for the separation of powers to stymie credit guarantee system reform. 
Instead, other barriers obstructed potential change to the system. For one, limited public 
access to the policymaking behind the system afforded a few well-organized interests with 
stakes in system’s high guarantee ratios a substantial degree of influence over the system’s 
structure. Government officials’ uncertainty about the potential effect of system modification, 
as well as collective action challenges for those who wanted to pare down the system, also 
played roles in mitigating credit guarantee system reform. This combination of factors enabled 
the system to continue serving large numbers of financially fragile firms, and likely contributed 
to zombie SME creation throughout the 2000s well after Japan’s banking crisis had ended.
Concern about the ill effects of the credit guarantee system emerged soon after the 
Special Guarantee Program’s implementation in October 1998. In January 1999, the widely-
read Nikkei business newspaper reported that some program users filed for bankruptcy 
less than one month after receiving guaranteed loans or took loans with no purpose simply 
because they were available. In February 2000, the Nikkei Financial newspaper also reported 
that program users made stock investments with guaranteed loans intended for company 
operations (Uesugi and Sakai 2005, 6). Then, in November 2000, the Tokyo District Attorney’s 
Special Investigation Department announced that several secretaries belonging to sitting Diet 
members from the Komeito, Democratic Party, and New Conservative Party had illegally taken 
commissions on guaranteed loans for ineligible borrowers, and that at least 450 Diet members 
and local assemblymen had intervened as brokers in more than 10,000 cases of guaranteed 
loans issued by the Tokyo Credit Guarantee Corporation. At the time, the large-scale abuse 
of the system was considered indicative of a “social problem” (shakai mondai) (Yamazaki Tai 
2017).
Japanese economists were also quick to critique the credit guarantee system after the 
implementation of the Special Guarantee Program. Matsuura and Takezawa (2001) argued 
that the program’s guarantees did not actually increase the supply of loans to SME, while 
Takezawa, Matsuura and Hori (2004) contended that, after 1998, the widespread use of the credit 
guarantee system and especially the Special Guarantee Program led to increasing defaults 
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which in turn reduced the loan supply for SME because of higher credit risk. Doubts about the 
system’s impact on SME with healthy business conditions, as well as acknowledgement that 
the system required substantial government outlays to cover the annual deficits of individual 
credit guarantee corporations—which ranged between ¥200 billion and ¥600 billion in the 
period 1999-2004—eventually spurred the SME Agency (SMEA), the government agency in 
charge of Japan’s SME policy and the credit guarantee system, to convene a deliberative 
council (shingikai) about the future of the system in late 2004 (Uesugi and Sakai 2005, 7).7 
On the surface, the deliberative council may have seemed like an opportunity for 
public concern to effect change in the credit guarantee system’s structure and rein in its 
protectionism toward weak firms. However, despite the council’s semblance of openness to 
outside opinion, the most vocal attendees at the seven council meetings between December 
2004 and June 2005 were the system’s primary stakeholders. Of the 80 opinions about the 
system formally recorded by the SMEA at the conclusion of the council, 30 came from credit 
guarantee corporations, 20 came from associations representing SME, 11 came from financial 
institutions, and 10 came from regional governments. Only 9 opinions came from individual 
SME, scholars and citizens (Small and Medium Enterprise Agency 2005, 1). Thus, SMEA 
officials heard mostly insiders’ ideas about the credit guarantee system at the council as the 
officials weighed how to reform the system. Weak public representation was not peculiar to 
this particular deliberative council, but consistent with the common operation of such councils 
throughout postwar Japan as venues for interest groups to directly shape policymaking 
(Schwartz 1998).
Evidence suggests that SMEA officials were at least partly amenable to downsizing the 
credit guarantee system’s largess when they initiated the council. One official who then worked 
for the SMEA finance department remarked, “METI knew that we needed to change the 100 
percent guarantee system to the partial guarantee system maybe for 20 years—maybe from 
the 1980s, METI wanted to change the market-skewing guarantee system,” indicating that 
key political actors behind the system had considered possible alternatives to the system, and 
desired that a different arrangement be set in motion. However, the same official emphasized 
that agency officials were simultaneously reluctant to reform the system because of the 
possible effects on SME, saying, “METI has a responsibility to maintain the economy, to grow 
the economy. But they don’t want to have a huge, drastic impact to one of the specific sectors. 
So we had that kind of system. We didn’t, we couldn’t want to change drastically. Maybe 
you can say that it is kind of an ambivalent feeling, but it’s true. We would like to change the 
system gradually, but we don’t want to have a huge impact on the SME” (Interview 59).
Aside from uncertainty about system reform’s possible impact on SME, SMEA officials’ 
views on adjusting the credit guarantee system were also tempered by their interest in 
amassing bureaucratic power for themselves. In particular, within the agency’s finance 
department, influence and esteem were partly defined by the ability to secure large annual 
budgets from the Ministry of Finance (MOF) to pay for the system. Therefore, department 
officials typically strove to obtain as much funding as possible from MOF in the short term to 
7. One researcher specializing in SME research at the official think tank for Japan’s Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry suggested that SMEA officials began worrying about the system after the inception 
of the Special Guarantee Program, when they questioned, “Was it was really okay?” (Hontou ni daijoubu 
ka?) (Interview 32).
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enhance the department’s standing vis-à-vis other departments in the SMEA and METI—even 
coining a term for “plundering” funds from MOF (bundoriai)—despite that their long-term goal 
of downscaling was aligned with MOF’s vision for the system (Interview 59).
Given SMEA officials’ ambivalence about system adjustment and internal power 
motivations, key stakeholders in the credit guarantee system did not face opposition when 
they voiced their status quo preferences for the system at the deliberative council. The 
two main beneficiaries from the system, SME and financial institutions, were particularly 
cautious about system reform and expressed conservatism about the degree of change they 
could accept. On the council’s main issue of whether to reduce the system’s 100 percent 
guarantees, associations representing SME criticized the council’s proposed introduction of 
a “responsibility-sharing system” that would lower certain guarantee ratios to levels where 
banks would face loan loss risk, with one association saying, “While public sentiment that 
financial institutions bear no risk is not incomprehensible, the influence [of the responsibility-
sharing system] on banks’ lending behavior will be clear, and we cannot support it” (Small 
and Medium Enterprise Agency 2005, 14). Financial institutions also resisted the proposed 
change, with one commenting that Japan should not introduce such a system just because 
other foreign countries had done so, and another asking for more time—“at least two years”—
for banks to prepare for the details of such a system should it be realized (Small and Medium 
Enterprise Agency 2005, 15).
These stakeholders’ reluctance toward change reflected their vested interests in the 
credit guarantee system as it was then designed. As mentioned above, for many SME with 
fundamentally precarious business conditions, particularly but not only microenterprises, 
the system represented one of the few existing ways to obtain financing. Reduction in the 
system’s guarantee ratio thus threatened to extinguish a key credit source, since heightened 
possibility for loan loss might discourage banks from lending to weak customers. Because 
SME associations attending the council like the National Federation of Small Business 
Associations (NFSBA) and the Central Federation of Societies of Commerce and Industry 
(CFSCI) were pyramid organizations covering tens of thousands of local associations and 
chambers at the prefectural and sub-prefectural levels and collectively represented millions of 
SME, their opinions against credit guarantee system reform at the council could not easily be 
ignored by SMEA officials (Interviews 35, 36).
Financial institutions were also beneficiaries of the credit guarantee system’s high 
coverage ratios and thus disinclined toward change. Regional banks and smaller financial 
institutions like credit cooperatives and credit unions were particularly strong backers of the 
system, since their operations in the Japanese countryside meant that their loan portfolios 
consisted largely of loans to SME, and loans to SME carried higher interest rates.8 Furthermore, 
regional markets faced significant demographic decline and stagnant economic growth relative 
8. Data from after the deliberative council suggest the critical importance of SME to regional banks’ 
business operations. In the fiscal year ending in March 2012, only three out of 116 Japanese banks 
had less than 50 percent of their loan portfolios filled by loans to SME—Mizuho Corporate Bank (37.3 
percent), Mitsubishi UFJ (46.8 percent), and Sumitomo Trust Bank (47.4 percent)—and these were all 
large banks. By contrast, for regional banks such as Suruga Bank (95.2 percent), Taisho Bank (93.1 
percent), Kinki Osaka Bank (92.7 percent), Shizuoka Chuo Bank (92.2 percent), Minami Nihon Bank 
(92.2 percent), Kansai Urban Bank (92.0 percent) and Awa Bank (90.1 percent), SME constituted more 
than 90 percent of their loan portfolios (Tokyo Shoko Research 2012).
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to Japan’s urban centers, which intensified competition over the dwindling pool of remaining 
SME borrowers and created profit pressures that made loan guarantees an attractive device for 
maintaining if not improving lenders’ bottom lines (Shimizu 2008, 128–31). Surveys conducted 
by the FSA showed that 70 percent of SME using credit guarantees had been recommended 
to do so by their banks (Interview 28), showing that banks valued the system’s mitigation of 
risk and thus had an interest in preserving the status quo.
While these two key stakeholders officially communicated their preferences about system 
reform to the SMEA through opinions formally issued at the deliberative council, there is reason 
to believe that they also advocated to agency officials in ways that were less observable to 
other council attendees and the wider Japanese public. For example, when asked about how 
the CFSCI gave policy recommendations to the SMEA, a representative from the association 
said that, besides making paper reports, “on detailed matters, it makes a phone call or sends 
an email. Basically, it talks to them directly” (Interview 36). A NFSBA representative also 
mentioned having “close information exchange” (missetsu na jouhou koukan) with METI, 
implying that that the association’s leadership was familiar with ministry officials to a personal 
degree that transcended contact at the deliberative council meetings (Interview 35). In other 
words, while SMEA records show that central players in the credit guarantee system advocated 
conservative positions about adjusting the system, the records do not necessarily convey the 
full extent to which these powerful players lobbied SMEA officials to maintain the status quo. 
Deliberative council records also omit a key group of actors who likely influenced 
officials’ thinking about amending the system behind the scenes—elected politicians. Though 
politicians’ election campaign manifestos did not mention the credit guarantee system and 
few if any politicians took strong public stances on SME policy (Interviews 36, 35), politicians 
were still uniform in their underlying support for SME, irrespective of political party (Interviews 
32, 59). This was particularly true of politicians at the prefectural and municipal levels, where 
multimember electoral districts with narrower electoral margins heightened the significance 
of SME as a reliable voting bloc that could be mobilized on politicians’ behalf (Shimizu 2013, 
155). 
While there is no indication that politicians directly influenced the deliberative council, 
other evidence suggests how politicians lobbied SMEA officials to benefit SME. For example, 
at the time of the deliberative council in 2005, one of the main tasks inside the SMEA finance 
department was reportedly an activity called “window introduction” (madoguchi shokai) 
whereby department personnel would receive phone calls from politicians who wanted the 
agency to help certain SME in the politicians’ home districts. Ostensibly, the politicians’ calls 
were to request the location of nearest GFI, but in truth the calls were intended to make 
agency officials subsequently contact the GFI and suggest that the SME could use favorable 
treatment in their loan applications. Politicians’ appeals for window introductions were so 
frequent that the SMEA finance department assigned a dedicated chief clerk to handle them 
(Interview 59). It is not unreasonable to assume that politicians making these frequent calls 
also impressed upon agency officials the importance of the credit guarantee system to their 
local SME, thus affecting officials’ thinking about how far system revision could go.
A more telling indicator of politicians’ support for the credit guarantee system was the 
formation of the system’s budgets. Since MOF opposed the system’s 100 percent guarantee 
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under the belief that it undermined banks monitoring toward borrowers, MOF strongly pushed 
back against SMEA officials when they made their annual budget request to compensate for 
the system’s deficits, which caused the system’s primary budgets to be small. However, the 
system was also allocated a supplementary budget each year, and the process for making 
this latter budget was notably more lenient. Because the supplementary budget was made 
according to a shorter schedule and often timed to immediately follow the installation of a new 
cabinet to maximize political appeal, MOF found it hard to deny large outlays for the credit 
guarantee system through this second budget. Moreover, because MOF knew that it would 
encounter politicians’ anger if it disallowed substantial funding for the system, it reportedly 
asked SMEA officials to “bring [budget] balls” (tama o motte koi) for the supplementary budget 
which MOF would summarily authorize. Agency officials were fully aware of these constraints 
on MOF around the time of the supplementary budget and were confident that they could 
exploit them to obtain as much funding as necessary to cover for the credit guarantee system. 
If MOF did not comply, the officials would simply ask politicians to pressure the ministry until 
it conceded (Interview 59). Table 4 shows that the annual supplementary budget for the credit 
guarantee system was regularly larger than the primary budget until 2012, suggesting the 
constancy of politicians’ support for the system as a means to help SME.
Table 4. Central Government Budget Allocations to the Credit Guarantee System, 1999-2015
Source: SME Policy Council Finance Working Group (2015, 27) 
Unit: ¥100 million
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Against this combination of ambivalent SMEA officials and status quo-favoring interest 
groups and politicians, the voices who plainly opposed the system’s high-level guarantees 
were the minority at the deliberative council. One individual opinion referred to the cost of 
the system from the public’s perspective, saying, “The issue of conserving tax money is an 
extremely important subject given the current situation in which there is overbanking toward 
SME and reducing the national debt is an urgent duty,” while another individual opinion drew 
attention to the opacity of the council’s own assessment of the system, saying, “It is a problem 
of the system that there is no transparency around who is evaluating the system or how it is 
being evaluated. If it is ultimately supposed to be the peoples’ decision, one would think that 
opinion would overwhelmingly favor substantial downsizing of the system” (Small and Medium 
Enterprise Agency 2005, 19, 18). However, such critical views were the exception at what was 
mostly a forum for system insiders to reaffirm their interest in minimizing potential change.
Ironically, there were some grounds for believing that ordinary citizens might have spoken 
up against the scale of the credit guarantee system had they attended the deliberative council. 
Annual public opinion surveys conducted by the Cabinet Office indicate that the Japanese 
populace put low priority on government action on SME policy throughout the 2000 (Figure 
5), suggesting that the public had little interest in keeping the system’s substantial scale and 
guarantee ratios. Public opinion polls by the Asahi Shimbun newspaper during the Koizumi 
administration (2001-2006) also found that popular support for structural reforms remained 
above 50 percent (Kume 2009, 245), further implying that citizens may have favored credit 
guarantee system downsizing as they did Koizumi’s other neoliberal reforms.
Figure 5. Public Opinion on Issues Needing Government Action
Source: Government of Japan Cabinet Office (n.d.) 
Unit: Percentage of Respondents Saying Issue Needs Government Action
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On the other hand, it is questionable whether the Japanese public really knew enough 
about the credit guarantee system to want modification. One possible explanation for weak 
public demand for government action on SME policy may have been that the system’s 
insurance structure diffused potential local opposition. Because losses by individual credit 
guarantee corporations were insured by the central government through the JFC, their cost 
was diffused across taxpayers nationwide, rather than concentrated among the citizens in 
the jurisdictions where the losses occurred (Shimizu 2008, 76). A related explanation is that 
the system’s overall structure was simply too complex for many people to understand, with 
the government’s role masked by the subrogation process that, on the surface, made it seem 
like the system consisted of banks and individual credit guarantee corporations, despite the 
central government’s core role in underwriting the system (Interviews 34, 59).
Given that Japanese citizens showed little enthusiasm for protectionism toward SME but 
were not outspoken about downsizing the credit guarantee system, the handful of academic 
economists who criticized the system’s high guarantee ratios in the early 2000s had few 
allies in pushing for substantial system modification at the deliberative council. It thus fell to 
SMEA officials to decide what kind of reform would address the troubling questions about 
the system—the same officials who wanted to avoid thrusting drastic change upon SME, 
felt strong pressure from system stakeholders and politicians supportive of the status quo, 
and themselves held internal bureaucratic power motivations. Balancing these conflicting 
imperatives which leaned mostly towards system stasis, agency officials finally announced 
that a responsibility-sharing system lowering the system’s primary guarantee ratio from 100 to 
80 percent would be enacted in October 2007—a date that was two years after the deliberative 
council, in alignment with the request from one of the financial institutions present at the 
council.
While the responsibility-sharing system portended to sharpen banks’ incentive to monitor 
guarantee users and screen out SME prone to default on loan repayment—and thus possibly 
reduce the number of zombie SME in the system—100 percent guarantees were still granted 
to several large categories of system users, thereby dulling the reform’s effect on excising 
moral hazard. These categories included microenterprises (the majority of system users), 
SME that were affected by natural disasters, SME that were startups, and SME that qualified 
for the system’s various specific safety-net programs. One of these safety-net guarantees in 
particular, Safety Net 5 for firms in declining industries, continued to have conspicuously high 
subscription in future years, with more than 2 million SME users between 2006 and 2015 
(SME Policy Council Finance Working Group 2016, 12). In short, though responsibility-sharing 
signified a shift toward introducing risk into banks’ lending practices with SME, numerous 
exemption categories perpetuated the system’s agency problem. Later studies showed that 
the 80 percent guarantee in the responsibility-sharing system did not entirely remove moral 
hazard either (Saito and Tsuruta 2014), meaning that the reform’s impact was modest at best.
Less than a year after the unveiling of the responsibility-sharing system, Japan was hit by 
the global financial crisis. As one would expect, Japanese politicians responded to the crisis 
by rallying to the cause of SME with various assistance measures, including enhancements 
to the credit guarantee system. On October 31, 2008, an “Emergency Guarantee System” 
(Kinkyu hosho seido) was established to provide 100 percent guarantees to SME in designated 
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industries where average sales had declined by 3 percent from the previous year. Under this 
new program and the existing Safety Net Number 5 program, new loan guarantees surged 
in fiscal year 2008, climbing to approximately ¥20 trillion and putting the total balance of loan 
guarantees at ¥34 trillion by yearend (Yamori et al. 2013, 74). Statistics from the National 
Federation of Credit Guarantee Corporations, the peak organization for Japan’s individual 
credit guarantee corporations, show that more than half of the SME using the Emergency 
Guarantee System were users of the credit guarantee system prior to taking advantage of 
the new system, demonstrating that many SME were already weak and dependent on credit 
guarantees before the crisis struck. Moreover, many of these firms would have likely qualified 
for the Emergency Guarantee System even had the crisis never happened, since their financial 
precariousness meant they were highly prone to sales swings exceeding the minimalistic 
qualifying threshold of 3 percent (Yamori 2011, 22–23).
Though the Emergency Guarantee System ended in March 2011, the popularity of the 
remaining Safety Net Number 5 program was such that loans subject to 100 percent guarantees 
through the program were a larger portion of the overall stock of outstanding guaranteed loans 
than the loans issued through the responsibility-sharing system until 2013 (SME Policy Council 
Finance Working Group 2016, 27). Given the widespread use of 100 percent guarantees after 
the global financial crisis and the fact that even the responsibility-sharing system’s 80 percent 
guarantees produced some degree of moral hazard, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
credit guarantee system continued to play a significant role in zombie SME creation well into 
the 2010s.
5. Conclusion
This paper examined zombie firms among Japanese SME in the two decades after 
Japan’s banking crisis in the 1990s. Starting from statistical findings suggesting that the 
zombie ratio among SME remained consistently high in this period, the paper proposed that 
a distinct causal mechanism underpinned zombie SME which was absent from listed firms 
where the zombie ratio declined in the early 2000s due to transparency-enhancing regulatory 
changes and new bankruptcy laws. Specifically, the paper investigated the possibility that 
assurances given to private banks via a particular policy arrangement—the credit guarantee 
system—might have contributed to the formation of zombie SME.
While the enlargement of Japan’s credit guarantee system was initially conceived 
as a crisis countermeasure for the credit crunch in the late 1990s, the continuation of the 
system’s generous scale and high coverage ratios throughout the 2000s was puzzling from 
the perspective of Japan’s positive macroeconomic environment, which suggested that 
reduction might have been feasible. It was also curious from the perspective of conventional 
theoretical wisdom, which expected that Japan’s majoritarian electoral reform would reduce 
protectionism. As a possible explanation for why the system remained largely unchanged 
and likely contributed to supporting zombie firms even after economic recovery and a shift to 
majoritarian electoral rules, the paper explored the hypothesis that Japan’s credit guarantee 
system underwent drift.
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The paper found evidence largely consistent with this hypothesis. In particular, limited 
public participation in the deliberative council where system reform was discussed in the 
mid-2000s enabled key stakeholders, especially SME associations and regional financial 
institutions, to dampen the extent of adjustment. Though government officials in charge of the 
system had long wanted to reduce the system’s guarantee ratios, these stakeholders’ strong 
opposition, as well as the officials’ own uncertainty about the possible effects of change and 
constant informal pressure from politicians, impaired reforms that would have caused banks to 
accept significant risk when lending to SME and thereby incentivized the banks to more strictly 
screen out weak loan applicants. Academic economists were critical of the system at the time 
of the deliberative council, but their outspokenness was unmatched by Japanese taxpayers, 
who, despite seeming to put low priority on SME policy, appeared either indifferent or unaware 
toward the system’s substantial costs and were not well represented at council meetings. 
Facing little organized opposition, officials overseeing the system subsequently 
implemented a responsibility-sharing arrangement whose effect on changing banks’ lending 
behavior toward weak SME was modest. Furthermore, the credit guarantee system was 
expanded again during the global financial crisis and mostly served habitual systems users 
that were chronically tenuous, instead of healthy firms temporarily suffering from the downturn. 
In this way, the highly protectionist character of the system endured well into the second 
decade of the 21st century, prolonging Japan’s encounter with zombie firms.
While zombie SME were actually supported if not officially condoned by Japanese 
politicians, many public officials, and countless small businesses and regional and local 
financial institutions, it is also important to note the early research finding suggesting that 
many SME escape from zombie status. In other words, though the overall percentage of 
zombie SME was relatively high due in part to the credit guarantee system, many zombie SME 
appear to have regained corporate health in short order. Future work on zombie firms among 
Japanese SME should attempt to estimate the duration of zombie status to see whether 
guarantee recipient SME endure similarly short zombie timespans, as well as the potential 
problem of market congestion posed by the original zombie firm research. Investigations on 
these fronts could help clarify whether zombie status should be understood as an indirect 
type of social support in the form of “welfare-through-work,” or a policy epiphenomenon with 
negative externalities and effects for Japan’s economic growth in the post-bubble period. 
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6. Appendix: List of Field Interviews
Note: All interviews conducted in Japanese unless otherwise noted by E (conducted in English). The mark “--” represents identifying information which is 
redacted to maintain interview subject anonymity.
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